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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
Plaintiff is not asking this Court, as Respondents contend, 
to overrule the Commission's Findings of Fact. Plaintiff is 
simply asking this Court to set a proper standard of review in 
questions concerning late filing by an employer who, as with any 
other party, deserves a fair opportunity to be heard. The facts, 
as determined by the Commission, support Plaintiff's claim. 
POINT II 
The proper standard to be used by lower tribunals within the 
Department of Employment Security, as with lower courts, is the 
statement of public policy set forth in Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., 
which allows a litigant to have his day in court, on a showing of 
mistake or excuseable neglect for not filing within the original 
time limit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUPPORT 
RESPONDENTS' POSITION. 
In Point I of their Brief, Respondents state that it is the 
duty of this Court to uphold the Commission's Findings of Fact. 
In so contending, Respondents wish to draw the Court off from the 
issues at hand. The Findings of Fact of the Commission, and the 
Administrative Law Judge, were that the employer's late filing 
was not due "to circumstances beyond the control of the 
Appellant, and were not for circumstances which were 'reasonable 
and compelling1". If that had been the proper standard of 
review, perhaps the Respondents would be correct in their 
contention. Respondents, in Point II of their Brief, set forth 
in some detail the facts as ascertained at the hearing in front 
of the Administrative Law Judge. While these facts were not gone 
into in great detail in the employer's previous Brief, perhaps a 
further reiteration of them is appropriate here, in reply, the 
employer contends that this whole problem was the result of the 
negligence of Respondents. The employer's place of business has 
long been headquartered at 3265 Richards Street, #1, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84115. The employer's business interests included 
businesses located at some, but not all, of the suites at 60 West 
3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. Because Respondents 
became aware that some business was done at the latter address, 
mail was regularly sent by Respondents to the employer at the 
generic address. No suite number was ever listed. Several 
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requests were made through counsel to change the address to the 
proper one for the corporation, all to no avail. Therefore, 
Respondents mail to the employer was delivered on a hit and miss 
basis* Previous to the hearing by the Administrative Law Judge, 
a finding of default against employer had been made in this case, 
and vacated, when it was determined that notices sent to the 
employer had never been received, due to faulty addressing. It 
was only after counsel for the employer tired of the continual 
unsuccessful attempts to get mail sent to the proper address that 
he asked that mail be delivered directly to him. Unfortunately, 
the first time this was done, there was apparently a further foul 
up in forwarding from his office to the proper address of his 
client. According to the client, at the hearing (as indicated on 
page 23 of Respondents' Brief) the mail from counsel to client 
was set aside and remained unopened and unnoticed for a period of 
time. The Findings of Fact on the part of the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Commission are not disputed. The facts themselves 
are not disputed. Only the invalid conclusion based on Rule "HM 
of the Unemployment Insurance Rules is disputed. Certainly the 
facts make out a good case for inadvertance or excuseable 
neglect. Certainly the bureaucratic incompetance and negligence 
which originally caused the communication problem militate in 
favor of giving the employer his day in Court. That does not 
require the Court to ignore the Commission's Findings of Fact. 
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POINT II 
RULE 60(b) U.R.C.P. DOES APPLY TO THIS CASE AS A 
STATEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
In Point III of Respondents1 Brief, the contention is made 
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply only in such cases 
as the instant one when they do not conflict with the 
unemployment insurance rules. It is contended that the 
Department of Employment Security, pursuant to statute, is given 
rule making authority which gives the Department the right to 
supercede a rule of procedure. That, it is contended has been 
done by the adoption of Rule "H", which supercedes the policies 
of Rule 60 U.R.C.P. The employer does not deny that the 
Department is given rulemaking authority, so long as those rules 
are reasonable and do not produce results that are contrary to 
public policy. The employer has cited the Rule of Civil 
Procedure, and cases construing it, in which it is stated that it 
is the public policy of this State to give litigants a day in 
court, when it appears a valid controversy exists. The 
California Court of Appeals, in the previously cited case of 
HnA.fc.ed £fc.afc£.£ Eo^fc^i S.£.JLX±£.£ ZS^ £LaAA1.2£iiAa Hn£inpA£yiit£rit 
Insurance Appeals Boardf has appeared to take the pos i t ion t ha t 
the p u b l i c p o l i c y argument cannot be over idden by more 
r e s t r i c t i v e wording of an unemployment insurance ru le . That 
Appellate Court interpreted the unemployment insurance rule in 
conformity with the public policy of Rule 60(b) of our Rules of 
Procedure. The employer contends tha t t h i s can be done here, or 
in the a l t e r n a t i v e , t ha t the Department of Employment Securi ty 
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can be told to redraft their rule to express the proper public 
policy. In either case, Appellant would be given its day in 
Court, and allowed to express its very valid concerns about the 
payment of an invalid claim to Ms. Preece. 
Respondents go into some detail in their Brief in an effort 
to convince the Court that it should not disturb the lower 
tribunal in the proper use of its discretion. The standard for 
review, it is contended, is that the lower tribunal has abused 
its discretion. Once again, Respondents are trying to divert 
attention from the real issue. The Administrative Law Judge, and 
the Commission in upholding him, used an invalid standard. The 
standard used by the commission did not allow it to validly 
exercise its discretion. Appellant is not asking this Court to 
overrule the Commission within its discretion. Appellant is 
asking this Court to advise the Commission on how its discretion 
must be exercised and then allow it to do its job properly. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the employer's contention that 
he was not given a fair opportunity to be heard and to present 
his side of the issues should be upheld, and this matter should 
be remanded to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
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with instructions to grant Plaintiff a hearing. 
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